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[L. A. No. 29342.

In Bank.

June 2,1967.]

MICHAEL F. JEHL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SOUTHERN P ACIFIC COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] New Trial-Insufficiency of Evidence-Discretion-Review:
Damages-Inadequate Damages-Review of Order Granting or
Denying New Trial.-An appellate eourt eannot find an abuse
of diseretion in granting a new trial for insuffieiency of the
evidenee on the adequacy of damages awarded unless it appears from the record that the verdict was adequate as a
matter of law.
[2a, 2b] Id.-Inadequate Damagea.-The trial court did not abuse
its diseretion in granting a new trial limited to the issue of
d,amages on the ground that the jury award of $100,000 in
damages was inadequate, where plaintiff's right leg was amputated below the knee and his left leg, seriously injured,
became affeeted by permanent chronic osteomyelitis, where he
suft'ered great pain for 16 months,: undergoing 18 operations,
and would require treatment well into the future, and where
his projeeted gross ineome until age 65, exceeding $500,000,
was substantially redueed by his injuries, and the projeeted
costs of his prosthetic applianees exceeded $15,000.
Melt. Dig. References: [1 ] New Trial, § 99; Damages, § 92; [2]
New Trial, § 82.1; [3] New Trial, 182.1; Damages, § 109; [4]
Trial, § 227; New Trial, § 82.5; [5] Words and Phrases; [6, 11-15]
Damages, § 109.5; New Trial, § 82.5; [7, 8] Damages, § 109.5; [9]
Jury, § 5(1); [10] Jury, § 5(1); Trial, § 125; [16] Master and
Servant, § 204, Damages, § 109.5; [17, 18] Master and Servant,
1204(1) ; [19] Master and Servant, § 201.
-Retired ABSociate Justice of the Supreme Court IrittiDe UDder auiCUaent by the Chairman of the Judicial CounciL
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[3a, 3b] Id.-Inadequate Damages: Damages-Inadequate Damages.-Error, as a matter of law, in the trial court's conclusion
that a jury award of $100,000 in damages was inadequate, was
not shown by defendant's evidence that plaintiff, a young man
with serious leg injuries and resulting osteomyelitis, made no
effort at rehabilitation, had not exercised or sought job counseling and spent his days generally watching television, where
such evidence at most indicated that he may have exaggerated
his damages, and where the trial court could reasonably have
concluded that plaintiff's pecuniary losses alone would exceed
the amount of the verdict and that a substantial additional
amount should be allowed for pain and suffering.
[4] Trial-Verdict-Amendment by Jury: New Trial-Inadequate
Damages - Additur. - Only if the jury allows damages so
grossly inadequate as to show that it must have disregarded
the evidence and the court's instructions, or the verdict is
otherwise defective, should the jury be returned for further
delibeFation under proper instructions; and if the trial judge
believes that the damages are inadequate, but the verdict is
not defective, the proper procedure is to set the verdict aside
on motion for a new trial.
[5] Words and Phrases - "Additur." - "Additur" is an order by
which a plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground of
inadequate damages is granted unless the defendant consents
to a specified increase of the award within a prescribed time•
. [6a, 6b] Damages-Inadequate Damages-Additur-Procedure:
New Trial-Inadequate Damages.-On a motion for new trial
grounded on insuftlciency of the evidence because the jury
award of damages is inadequate, the court, on determining
that such damages are clearly inadequate and that the ease
,vould be a proper one for granting the motion limited to damages, may in its discretion and in all such cases issue an order
granting the motion unless the defendant consents to an additur as determined by the court (overruling Dorsey v. Barba,
38 Ca1.2d 350 [240 P.2d 604] ).
[7a.-7c] Id. - Inadequate Damages - Additur - Constitutionality.
-Although the practical effect of an additur is to give a
plaintiff an award based on a finding made ultimately by the
trial court, it does not detract from the substance of the
common law trial by jury, nor violate the constitutional guaranty thereto (Cal. Const. Art. I, § 7).
[8a,8b] Id.-Inadequate Damages-Additur-Nature a.nd Purpose.
-Additur is a new procedure adopted to promote economy
and efficiency in judicial proceedings.
[9] Jury-Right to Jury Trial-Constitutional Guaranty-Opera,.

-----------------------------[6] See Cal.Jur.2d. Damages, § 226; Am.Jur.2d. Damages, § 398.
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tion and E1fect.-The guaranty of jury trial (Cal. Con st. Art.
I, § 7) operates at the time of trial to )'equire submission of
certain issues to the jury, and the effect of the constitutional
provision, once a verdict has been returned, is to prohibit
improper interference with the jury's decision.
[10] Id.-Right to Ju1'7 Tria.l-Constitutional Guaranty-Scope:
Trial-Province of Court and Jury.-That the framers of the
Constitution did not regard the jury as the only competent
trier of fact is shown by the acceptance over many years of
the practice of the court determining fact issues in such rna tters as admitting or excluding evidence, the court's jurisdiction, sufficiency of pleadings and interpretation of documents
and in such proceedings as equity, admiralty, probate, divorce,
bankruptcy and administrative actions.
[11] Damages-Inadequate Damages-Additur-Where Applicable: New Trial-Inadequate Damages-Additur.-A court's
power to issue an order of additur is not limited to those cases
in which an appellate court would sustain either the granting
or denial of a motion for new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence.
[12] Id.-Inadequate Damages-Additur-Time for Defendant's
Oonsent: New Trial-Inadequate Damages-Additur.-In an
order of additur, the time which a court must pres~ribe within
which the defendant must consent may not exceed the jurisdictional period for granting a new trial, and if the defendant
fails to consent within that time, the order granting the new
trial becomes final.
[IS] Id.-Inadequate Damages-Additur-Amount: New TrialInadequate Damages-Additur.-If a court decides to order an
additur, it should set the amount of damages which, in its
completely independent judgment, it determines from theevidence to b~ fair and reasonable, and it need not fix minimum
or maximum amounts that it would have sustained on motion
"for new trial or that would be supported by substantial evidence and therefore sustainable on appeal.
[14] Id.-Inadequate Damages-Additur-Rejection by Defendant: New Trial-Inadequate Damages-Additur.-Jf a defendant deems an additur excessive, he may reject it and seek to
sustain the jury's award on an appeal from the order granting
a new trial.
[16] Id.-Inadequate Damages-Additur-Rejection by Plaintiff:
New Trial- Inadequate Damages - Additur. - If a plaintiff
deems an additur insufficient, he may raise the issue on an
appeal from the judgment as modified by the additur.
[16a, 16b] Master a.ndServant-Federal Employers' Liability Act
-Actions-Additur Procedure: Damages-Inadequate Damages-Additur.-The additur procedure to deal with inade-
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quate awards of damages by juries is applicable to actions
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in state
courts.
[17] Id. - Federal Employers' Liability Act - Actions - Law
Governing.-In actions brought under the Federal Employers'
Liability' Act in state courts, substantive rights are controlled
by the federal law and procedural matters by the law of the
forum.
[18] Iel. - Federal Employers' Liability Act - Actions - Law
Governing-Judge-Jury Relationship.-In actions brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in state courts, the
degree to which the judge-jury relationship is governed by
federal law turns, not on U.S. Const. 7th Amend., which is not
applicable to such actions, but on the U.S. Supreme Court'.
interpretation of the act itself.
[19] Id.-Federal Employers' Liability Act-Actions-Oonstruction of Act-Plainti1f'. Right to Reach Jury.-In actions
brought under the Federa~.l Employers' Liability Act the plaintiJfs have a broad primary right to go to the jury on factual
issues; a plaintiff has the right to reach the jury on the issue
of liability when there is any evidence to support his case,
even the slightest evidence, and even though the trial court
would be forced to set aside a jury verdict for him and grant a
new trial based on its view of all the evidence.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of LoS
Angeles County granting a new trial limited to damages in an
action for damages for personal injuries. Martin Katz, Judge.
Affirmed unless the trial court in its discretion orders an
additur to be accepted or rejected by defendaut within the
time prescribed by the court.
Randolph Karr, William E. Still, E. D. Yeomans and Norman T. Ollestad for Defendant and Appellant.
Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell and Edward
J. Niland for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In this action to recover damages for
personal injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
. (45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.) and the Safety Appliance Act (45
[17] Applicability of state practice and procedure in Federal
Employers' Liability Act actions brought in state courts, note, 79
A.L.R.2d 553. See also Oal.Jur.2d, Master and Servant, § 102 et
seq.; Am.Jur., Master and Servant (1st ed § 455 et seq).
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U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) defendant Southern Pacific Company appeals from an order granting plaintiff a new trial limited to
the issue of damages. The facts relating to plaintiff's injury
may be briefly stated, for defendant does not challenge its
liability.
On June 19, 1962, at approximately 3 :25 a.m., plaintiff was
working in defendant's railroad yard at South Gate, California. He was then 19 years old and had been ·working for
defendant for about 6 weeks. His job that night was to work
as a field man. As railroad cars were switched onto the track
he was working, plaintiff secured them by placing wooden
blocks under the wheels. The blocking was necessary because
the track was on a grade. Two cars failed to couple properly
with cars already secured and began to roll back. The foreman
told plaintiff to climb on the moving cars and secure them by
means of the handbrake on each car. As plaintiff was doing so
two other cars that had been sent up the track collided with
the cars coming down the track. The impact threw plaintiff
from the car he was riding and he fell under the wheels of onc
of the moving cars, receiving severe injuries to the lower part
of both legs. It was necessary to amputate his right leg below
the knee. The left leg remains in jeopardy of amputation
because osteomyelitis has developed in it.
The jury returned a verdict for $100,000, and plaintiff successfully moved for a new trial on the issue of damages on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict in that the damages awarded were inadequate. (See Code
Civ. Proc., § 657; Harper v. Superior Air Pa,rts, Inc., 124
Cal.App.2d 91,92 [268 P.2d 115].) Defendant contends that
the trial court erred in concluding that the damages were
inadequate and therefore abused its discretion in granting
plaintiff's motion. [1] An appellate court cannot find an
abuse of discretion in granting a new trial for insufficiency of
the evidence unless it appears from the record that the verdiet
was adequate as a matter of law. (See Yarrow v. State of
Oalifornia, 53 Ca1.2d 427, 434 [2 Cal.Rptr. 137, 348 P.2t1
687] ; Bradford v. Edmands, 215 Cal.App.2d 159, 166-167 [30
Cal.Rptr. 185].) No such adequacy appears here.
[2a] Plaintiff's right leg was amputated below the knee;
his left leg was so seriously injured that it may also have to
be amputated. There is permanent, chronic osteomyelitis in
the left leg that has required repeated surgical treatment amI
may require recurrent treatment well into the future, and
there is permanent limitation of motion in the left ankle.
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Plaintiff continues to suffer pains in his right leg. He was
hospitalized for 16 months following the accident and underwent 18 operations. Throughout this time he suffered great
pain, necessitating extensive administration of pain-killing
drugs. Had he not been injured, plaintiff's projected gross
income from the date of the accident to the age of 65 would
have exceeded $500,000. By substantially impairing his ability
to compete in the labor market, his injuries materially reduced this expectable earning power. The projected costs of
his prosthetic appliances exceeded $15,000. [Sa] It thus
appears that the trial court could reasonably have concluded
that plaintiff's pecuniary losses alone would exceed the
amount of the verdict and that a substantial additional
amount should be allowed for pain and suffering. [2b] Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in grant.
iug a new trial on the ground of inadequate damages.
[3b] 'Defendant contends, however, that because certain
evidence favorable to it is so compelling, we should not apply
the normal rule govcrning appellate review (see Bradford, v.
Edmands, supra, 215 Cal.App.2d at pp. 166-167), but should
make an independent determination of the adequacy of the
jury '8 verdict without regard to the ruling of the trial court.
The evidence in question consists of certain motion picture
films taken of defendant without his knowledge; uncontradicted testimony that he has made no effort at rehabilitation,
has not exercised, has not sought job counseling, and spends
his days generally watching television; and testimony that his
prosthesis is not of the most advanced design and unnecess:lrily restricts his mobility. Defendant contends that this evidence establishes that there should be a substantial improvement in plaintiff's physical, mental, and emotional condition
that will reduce his anticipated damages. At most this evidence would indicate that plaintiff may have exaggerated his
damages. It does not demonstrate that the trial court erred in
eoncluding that the verdict was inadequate.
[4] Invoking Crowe v. Sacks, 44 Ca1.2d 590 [283 P.2d
(j89], defendant contends that the trial court erred in not
I'(·t urning the jury for further deliberation under proper inst ructions, when it appeared that the damages were inadequate. There is no merit in this contention. Only if "the jury
C1110ws damages so grossly inadequate as to show that it must
have disregarded the evidence and the instructions of the
('ourt," or the verdict is otherwise defective, should the jury
"be returned for further deliberation under proper instruc-
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tions. " (Crowe v. Sacks, supra, 44 Ca1.2d at p. 598.) If, on
the other hand, "the trial judge believes that the damages are
inadequate [but the verdict is not defective], the proper procedure is to set the verdict aside on motion for new trial."
(Crowe v. Sacks, supra, 44 Ca1.2d at p. 599.)
[5] [See fn. 1] Defendant contends that the trial court
should have given defendant the option to consent to an additur l before granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial. We
consider this contention even though defendant did not directly request an additur in the trial court, for such a request
would have been an idle act. (Civ. Code, § 3532; cf. Hudspeth
v. Jaurequi, 234 Cal.App.2d 526,528 [44 Cal.Rptr. 428].) In a
discussion with counsel at the time for motions after trial, the
court made it clear that it would not order an additur. Indeed, in light of this court's decision in Dorsey v. Bm'ba, 38
Ca1.2d 350 [240 P.2d 604], holding additur to be unconstitutional, the trial court would have been bound to deny an
additur even if it had been specifically and directly requested.
(Auto EquUy Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Ca1.2d 450,
455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].)
Two questions must be resolved in considering defendant's
contention. First, should the decision in Dorsey v. Barba,
supra, 38 Ca1.2d 350, be overruled? Second, if so, can additur
be applied in the present case, which arises under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. section 51 et seq. ?

I.
In Dorsey this court held that additur would deny a plaintiff's right to jury trial as guaranteed by article I, section 7,
of the California Constitution. 2 Although the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution is not binding on the
states'S and differs significantly in langunge from the California constitutional provision,4 Dorsey relied in large part
1" Additur" is used here to describe an order by which a plaintiff's
motion for a new trial on the ground of inadequate damages is granted
unless the defendant consents to a specified increase of the award within
a prescribed time.
2Articlc I, section 7, provides: "The right of trial by jury shall be
sccured t" all, and remain inviolate; . . . "
aSee, e.g., Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 [24 L.Ed. 436, 437];
WaZker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90,92 f23 L.Ed. 678, 679].
4The Seventh Ameuclmeut provides: "In suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial Ly
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law." (Compare fn. 2, supra.)
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on Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 [79 L.Ed. 603, 55 8.Ct.
296, 95 A.L.R. 1150]. (See Dorsey v. Barba, supra, 38 Ca1.2d
at p. 357.) Dimick was a five-to-four deeision 5 and has been
vigorously eriticized. 6 Like Dorsey, Dimick was based on an
historical and logical analysis that was open to serious question. Since additur did not exist at common law when the
relevant constitutional provisions were adopted and since a
plaintiff is guaranteed the right of jury trial as it existed at
eommon law, additur was deemed a denial of that right.
(D·imick v. Schiedt, supra, 293 U.S. at pp. 476-482 [79 L.Ed.
at pp .605-609] ; Dorsey v. Barba, supra, 38 Ca1.2d at pp. 355359.)
Doth courts were confronted with the argument that addi..
tur is no more a denial of a plaintiff's right to jury trial than
remittitur is a denial of a d(·fendant's right. Although some
faint historical foundation was found for this difference in
tl'eatment,7' Dimick further relied on the tenuous ground that
remittitur left standing a part of the jury's award, whereas
additur constituted" a bald addition" to the verdict. S .
[6al We have reassessed Dorsey and overrule it, finding its
arguments unpersuasive when considered in the light of the
demands of fair and efficient administration of justice. We do
110t believe that defendants should be denied the advantages of
additur when they are required to submit to remittitur.
[7a, Sa] Even in Dorsey this court noted that the "constitutional guarantee does not require adherence to the letter of
:i.Justice Stone wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief .Justice
Hughes and .Justices Brandeis and Cardozo concurred.
.
6See, e.g., Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W.Va.L.Q. 1, 18;
.J ames, Remedies for Excessit'eness or Inadequacy of Verdicts : New Trial
on Some or All Isslles, RI~mittitllr and Additur, 1 Duquesne U.L. Rev.
143,154; Comment, 10 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 46; 23 Cal.L.Rev. 536, 537;
14 So.Cal.L.Rev. 490; see also the comment in 44 Yale L ..J. 318, 323-324,
on Schiedt v. Dimick (lst Cir. 1(34) 70 F.~d ;';'8.
7Dimick v. Schicclt, S1lpra, !!93 U.S. at p. 484. 79 L.EIl. at p. 610.
sD-imick v. Schiedt, supra, ~93 U.S. at p. 486, 79 L.Ed. at p. 611. There
are several replies to this argument. In reaching the larger verdict in·
volved in remittitur, the jury ha~ rejected all smaller amounts just U:J
they have rejected all lal'ger amount8 in reaching the smaller verdict
involved in additur. Neither verdict is more that of the jury than the
other. (See Carlin, Remittiturs and Aclditurs, supra, 49 W.Va.L.Q. 1, 18,
~-l-25; see also 44 Yale L.J. 318, 323.) Only additur retains all that waH
contained in the jury's verdict, and in both additur and remittitur something is taken from the litigant who is relying on the verdict. (See
Bender, Additur-The Power of the Tl'ial Court to De1lY a New Trial on
the Condition that Damages be Increascd, California Law Revision Commission, Recommendation and Study relatiug to Additur (Oct. 19(6) at
pp. 617,647-648.)

)
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common law practice, and new procedures better suited to the
efficient administration of justice may be substituted if there
is no impairment of the substantial features of a jury trial."
(Dorsey v. Barba, supra, 38 Cal.2d atp. 356.) We have COlleluded that additur is such a procedure. The demands of an
"efficient administration of justice" must be considered in
context. Since 1952, the year Dorsey was decided, there has
been a tremendous increase in filings in civil cases including
contested matters. Total dispositions in ordinary civil litigation increased more than fourfold during the 1952-1964
period. (Compare Judicial Council of California, Fourteenth
Biennial Report, Appendix A, pp. 102-104, with id., Twentieth Biennial Report, Tables 11-20, pp. 143-153.)9 Of course,
such practical considerations would be immaterial if additur
impaired the right to a jury trial. We do not believe it does.
In assessing the precedents, we search for the meaning and
substance of jury trial and are not rigidly bound by the exacting rules that happen to be' found on "the legal scrap heap of
a century and a half ago." (Dimick v. 8chiedt, supra, 293
U.S. at p. 495 [79 L.Ed. at p. 616] [Stone, J., dissenting] ; see
People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470, 476 [268 P. 909, 270 P.
1117].) [9] The guarantee of jury trial in the California
Constitution operates at the time of trial to require submission of certain issues to the jury. Once a verdict has been
returned, however, the effect of the constitutional provision is
to prohibit improper interference with the jury's decision. At
the time of the American Revolution, the English courts seldom interfered with the amount of the jury's verdict in actions involving torts against the person. (See Mayne on
Damages (11th ed. 1946) pp. 632-636; McCormick on Damages" pp. 26-27; Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 47 L.Q.Rev. 345, 364.) The reason for their refusal
to grant new trials in such cases was their view that determination of the amount of damages was within the exclusive
province of the jury. (See, e.g., Beardmore v. Carrington
(C.P. 1764) 2 Wils. 244, 249, 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 793.)
By the end of the 18th century, however, the Court of
King's Bench accepted the doctrine that new trials would be
granted in cases of torts against the person under appropriate
'The social and eeonomic costs of crowded dockets increase every year.
Additur's practical advantage in reducing these costs prompted the California Law Revision Commission to recommend legislation permitting
aome forms of additur thought not to be inconsistent with Dorsey v.
Barba. (See California Law Revision Commission Study,.-upra, fn. 8, at
pp. 607-614.)
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circumstances (Jones v. Sparrow (K.B. 1793) 5 T.R. 257, 101.
Eng. Rep. 144), but until the middle of the 19th century the
English courts refused to grant new trials on the ground of
inadequate damages (see Phillips v. London &- S.W. Ry.
(1879) 5 Q.B.D. 78). rfhe unwillingness to interfere with the
jury's decision, exemplified by the English courts, was a con·
trolling consideration in the first California case to discuS::J
the constitutional function of the jury with respect to the
assessment of damages, Payne v. Pacific M(Jil S.S. Co., 1 Cal.
33, where this court reversed an order granting a new trial
unless plaintiff remit some of the jury's award. The plaintiff
refused and appealed from the order granting a new trial.
The court held that this interference with the right of trial by
jury would result in "great abuse, if not the destruction of
this right. . . . " (Payne v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., supra, 1
Cal. at p. p7.) Although Pa.yne was approved the following
year in George v. Law, 1 Cal. 363, 365, the court held that the
plaintiff's consent authorized remittitur and that defendants
could not complain, because" the judgment stands for but one·
half the amount, for which the verdict of the jury was rene
dered." (Oeorge v. Law, supra, 1 Cal. at p. 365.) These early
English and California cases illustrate that the right to jury
trial was regarded as a protection to parties relying upon a
verdict. The modern practice of granting new trials because of
excessive or inadequate damages constitutes a limitation on
the former broad powers of the jury.
[7b] It is true that the practical effect of additur is to
give the plaintiff. an award based upon a finding made ulti.
mately by the trial court. [10] Courts often determine fact
issues, however, and the acceptance of this practice over many
years refutes the argument that the framers of the Constitu.
tion regarded the jury as the only competent finder of facts.
Decisions by the court admitting or excluding evidence at
trial involve factual determinations as do those pertaining to
the court's jurisdiction, the sufficiency of pleadings, and the
interpretation of documents. Other instances of judicial or
quasijudicial fact-finding are found in equity, admiralty, pro.
bate, divorce, bankruptcy, and administrative proceedings.
At the time of the American Revolution, there was no clear
standard or practice governing the relationship between judge
and jury. (See Henderson, The Background of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 Harv.hRev. 289, 335-336.) If any reliable
cone1usion can be drawn from t.he practice of that time, it is
that plaintiff would not have had the right to a reassessment
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of damages by a second jury; the first jury's determination
of the amount of damages was conclusive. Reexamination of
the damages issue following an inadequate verdict is a modern
development. Had the English judges in the late 18th century
been willing to give a plaintiff's motion for new trial any
consideration at all, as judges do time and again today, there
is good reason to believe that they would have used additur.tO
Remittitur happened to develop earlier than additur because courts undertook to grant new trials for excessive damages long before they took similar action on the ground of
inadequacy. (See McCormick on Damages, pp. 72-73; Wasllington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 47 L.Q. Rey.
345, 365, fn. 7.) The issue of additur was not presented until
--modern times, but it is a logical step in the growth of the law
relating to unliquidated damages as remittitur was at an
earlier date. Its acceptance, though still somewhat retarded, is
growing.l l It should not be treated differently from other
modern devices aimed at making the relationship between
judge and jury as to damages12 as well as to other matters,13
lOA practice similar to additur was employed for some time prior to
1791 in actions for mayhem. (See Carlin, Bemittiturs and .Ad~it'Urs,
BUpra, 49 W.Va.L.Q. 1, 27; see also 44 Yale L.J. 318, 323.)
,
llSee, e.g., SmW, v. Ellyson, 137 Iowa, 391, 395-396 [115 N.W. 40];
Gensel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527. 529-534 [80 N.W.2d 854]; Volker v.
P'rst Natt Bank, 26 Neb. 602, 606 [42 N.W. 731]; Fisch v. Manger,
24 N.J. 66, 71-80 [130 A.2d 815]; Caudle v. Swanson, 248 N.C. 249, 256261 [103 S.E.2d 357]; Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 45·46 [327
P.2d 826]; Cordes v. Hoffman, 19 Wis.2d 236, 241 [120 N.W.2d 137]. Cf.
Power8 v. All8tate In8. Co .• 10 Wis.2d 78, 87-92 [102 N.W.2d 393]. Until
Power8 and Cordes, the Wisconsin practice concerning additur required
the trial court to grant a new trial for inadequate damages unless tll('
defendant consented to the highest nmount a jury could reasonably award.
(Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370 [214 N.W. 374, 53 A.L.R. 771];
compare O'Connor v. Papertsian, 309 N.Y. 465, 472-473 [131 N.E.2d 883,
56 A.L.R.2d 206].) Now the trial court is empowered to grant a reasonable amount. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has concluded that this
practice does not violate the right to jury trial. (See also Markota v.
East Ohio Gas Co., 154 Ohio St. 546, 552-559 [97 N.E.2d 13] (individunl
opinion of Taft, J.).)
12For example, both remittitur and a new trial limited to damages have
been held not to deny the right to jury trial. (See Northern Pac. B.R.
Co. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642. 646-647 [29 L.Ed. 155, 758, 6 S.Ct. 590];
George v. Law, 8upra, 1 Cal. 363, 365 [remittitur]; Gasoline Product.'1
Co. v. Champlin eto. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499-500 [75 L.Ed. 1188, 1190-119].
51 S.Ct. 513]; Brewer v. Second Bapti8t Church, 32 Ca1.2d 791, 801 [197
P.2d 713]; TayZor v. Pole, 16 Cal.2d 668, 675 [107 P.2d 614] [new trial
limited to damages].)
18For example, judgment notwithstanding the verdict is allowed in thjs
state in eases where directed verdicts are proper. (Estate of Baird, 198
Cal. 490, 506 [246 P. 324].) Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S.
8M [57 L.Ed. 879, 33 S.Ct. 523], held the granting of a judgment not~)
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one that preserves the essentials of the right to jury trial
without shackling modern procedure to outmoded precedents.
[7c] Additur does not detract from the substance of the
common law trial by jury. [8b] Like its fraternal twin
remittitur, now over 100 years old in this state, it promotes
economy and efficiency in judicial proceedings.
There is no essential difference between the procedures appropriate for remittitur and additur, and we may therefore
look to remittitur cases to determine the proper procedure for
additur.
[ab] Upon a motion for new trial grounded on insuftlciency of the evidence because the damages are inadequate,
the court should tirst determine whether the damages are clear- .
ly inadequate and, if so, whether the case would be a proper
one for granting a motion for new trial limited to damageS~
(See e.g., Hamasaki v. ~lotho, 39 Cal.2d 602, 604-607 [248
P .2d 910].) 14 If both conditions exist, the court in its discretion-may issue an order granting the motion for new trial
unless the defend·ant consents to an additur as determined by
the court. The court's power extends to all such cases.
[11] It is not limited to those cases in which an appellate
court would sustain either the granting or denial of a motion
for new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence.I I
[12] The court shall prescribe the time within which the
defendant must accept the additur, and in no case may this
time be longer than the jurisdictional period for granting a
new trial (Code Civ. Proc., § 660; cf. McDonald v. Randolph,
80 Cal.App.2d 367, 369 [181 P.2d 909].) If the defendant
fails to consent within the prescribed time, the order granting
the new trial becomes final.
[18] If the court decides to order an additur, it should set
the amount that it determines from the evidence to be fair
withstanding the verdict to be inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution, but the decision haa been thoroughly
undermined by Baltimore 4" Carolina LiM v. Bedmml, 295 U.S. 654 (79
L.Ed. 1636. 55 S.Ct. 890], and Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). See Neely v. Manita
K. Eby COMtr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 321 [18 L.Ed.2d 75, 80. 87 S.Ot. 1072,
1076]; Henderson. The Bac1cgrO'Und 0/ the Seventh Amendm.t, IUpra,
80 Harv.L.Rev.• 289, 337. tn. 211.
uThere was no contention in the present case that the jury's verdict
was the result of passion or prejudice or that it was tainted by preju·
dicial error occurring at trial.
liS Since we overrule Dorsey, it is unnecessary to limit additur to thOlM
cues where the jury'a verdict is aupported b;, substantial evidence. (Sec
Code Civ. Proe•• I 662.5. added. by Stats. 1967. eh. 71, I 2; CaUtomia La..
Revision Commission Stud;,. supra, tn. 8, at pp. 608~610, 613·614.)
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and reasonable. In this respect it should exercise its completely independent judgment. It need not fix either the minimum or maximum -amount that it would have sustained on a
motion for new trial or the minimum or maximum amount
that would be supported by substantial evidence and therefore
sustainable on appeal. [14] If the defendant deems the additur excessive, he may reject it and seek to sustain the jury's
award on an -appeal from the order granting a new trial.
[15] If the plaintiff deems the additur insufficient, he may
raise the issue on an appeal from the judgment as modified by
the additur.
II.

[16a] It remains to be determined whether the trial court
may order an additur in cases like the present one that arise
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
[17] In actions brought under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act in state courts, substantive rights are controlled
by the federal law and procedural matters by the law of the
forum. (Second Employers' Liability Oases, 223 U.S. 1, 55
[56 L.Ed. 327, 348, 32 8.Ct. 169]; Garrett v. Moore-McOormack 00., 317 U.S. 239, 244 [87 L.Ed. 239, 243, 63 8.Ct.
246] ; Davee v. Southern Pac. 00., 58 Ca1.2d 572, 575 [25
Cal.Rptr. 445, 375 P.2d 293].) For many years it seemed clear
that additur would be classed as procedural. In 1916 the
United States Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment had no application to actions brought under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act in state courts, and accordingly a
state could lawfully dispense with the unanimous verdict required at common law. (Minneapolis &- St. Louis R.R. 00. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217-223 [60 L.Ed. 961, 963-965, 36
8.0t. 595] ; accord Ohesapeake &- Ohio Ry. 00. v. Carnahan,
241 U.S. 241, 242 [60 L.Ed. 979, 981, 36 8.Ct. 594] [12 jurors
not required] . )
In 1952, however, the Supreme Oourt held that" the right
to trial by jury is too substantial a part of the rights· accorded
by the Act to permit it to be classified as a mere' local rule of
procedure'. . . . " (Dice v. Akron, Oanton &- Y. R.R. 00., 342
U.S. 359, 363 [96 L.Ed. 398, 404, 72 8.0t. 312].) The court
held that the question whether a release had been fraudulently obtained was one of fact for the jury, and that Ohio could
not apply its general rule that such a fraud issue was to be
decided by the court.
• C.»-a'I

)
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Neither in Dice, nor in the many cases following it, haa
Bombolis been overruled. In Dice, in fact, it was expressly
distinguished. (Dice v. Akron, Oanton &- Y. R.R. 00., supra,
342 U.S. at p. 363, 96 L.Ed. at p. 404.) [18] Accordingly,
we do not understand Dice to mean that the Seventh Amend.
ment is a'pplicable to actions brought under the Federal Em.
ployers' Liability Act in the state courts. Indeed, in noting
that the right to trial by jury is "part and parcel of the
remedy afforded railroad workers under the Employers Liability Act," the court in Dice cited Bailey v. Central Vermo-nl
Ry. 00.,319 U.S. 350, 354 [87 L.Ed. 1444, 1448,63 8.Ct. 1062],
which held that the right to jury trial is derived from the act.
(See also Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. 00., 352 U.S. 500, 508.
510 [1 L.Ed.2d 493, 500-502, 77 S.Ct. 443].) The degree to
which the judge-jury relationship is governed by federal law
thus turns on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the act,
rather than on the Seventh Amendment.16
[19] In interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability
Act the Supreme Court has insisted that plaintiffs have a
broad primary right to go to the jury on factual issues. (See
Rogers v. Missoori Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 [1 L.Ed.
2d 493,500, 77 8.Ct. 443] ; cf. Note, 73 Barv.L.Rev. 1551, 15&3"
1564; Supreme Oourt, 1951 Term, 66 Barv.L.Rev. 89, 162-164.)
The cases before and since Dice illustrate the court's concern
that plaintiffs reach the jury on the issue of liability whe):;
there is any evidence, "even the slightest," (Rogers v. Mis·
souri Pac. R.R. 00., supra, 352 U.S. at p. 506, 1 L.Ed.2d at p
499) to support the plaintiff's case (see, e.g;, Ferguson v
Moore-Mt!Oormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 [1 L.Ed.2d 511
77 8.Ct. 457] ; Webb v. Illinois Central R.R. 00.,352 U.S. 51~
[1 L.Ed.2d 503, 77 8.Ct. 451] ; Dice v. Akron, Oanton &- j
R.R. 00., supra, 342 U.S. 359; Wilkerson v. McOarthy, 33
U.S. 53 [93 L.Ed. 497, 69 8.Ct. 413] ; Bailey v. Central Vet
mont Ry. Co., 319 U.S. 350 [87 L.Ed. 1444, 63 8.Ct. 1062]:
Thus, the court has insisted that a case must go to the jury j
the evidence favorable to the plaintiff makes out a prima fac:

)

16See also the court's statement in Dice that the "right to trial by ju'
is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by the Act to peru:
it to be classified as a mere 'local rule of procedure J for denial in ,
manner that Ohio has here used." (Dice v. Akron, Canton tf Y. B.B. C
supra, 342 U.S. at p. 363, 96 L.Ed. at p. 404. (Italics added.) We do JJ
understand the statement in Atlantic 4' Gulf Stevedores I'M. v. Ellerm
Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 360 [7 L.Ed.2d 798, 804, 82 S.Ct. 780], tl
"the provisions of the Seventh Amendment •.. are brought into plaJ
to be inconsistent with our conclusion, for that case was tried in t
federal courta.
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case, even though the trial court would be forced to set aside a
jury verdict for the plaintiff and grant a new trial based on
its view of all the evidence. (Wilkerson v. McCarthy, supra,
336 U.S. at p. 57, 93 L.Ed. at p. 502.) The court may have
believed that trial courts are reluctant to overturn jury verdicts and therefore concluded that more liberal directed verdict standard might adversely affect a plaintiff's chances of
recovery. (See Note, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1551, 1563.)
[16b] Additur does not deprive a plaintiff of the right to
go to the jury on any issue or impair the substance of the
right to trial by jury. It operates only in the event a plaintiff
is dissatisfied with the jury's verdict. It will have no effect on
the activities of railroads and their employees and no substantial effect on the outcome of litigation between them- At the
same time, it will help implement this state's strong interest
in the fair and efficient administration of a voluminous
amount of litigation. (Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge etc. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 539-540 [2 L.Ed.2d 953, 963-964, 78
S.Ct. 893].) Moreover, since the Seventh Amendment is not
applicable we are not bound by Dimick or the amendment's
reexamination clause, which carries the federal Constitution
beyond the substance of the common law right to trial by
jury.l'l (Cf. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 [7
L.Ed. 732, 737].) The California Constitution contains no
such clause, and neither it nor the federal act forbid additur
just as they do not forbid remittitur. (Cf. Union Pac. R.R.
00. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330, 334 [62 L.Ed. 751, 755, 38 S.Ot.
318] ; Oomiskey v. Pennsylvania R.R. 00. (2d Cir. 1956) 228
F.2d 687, 688.)
.
The order granting a new trial limited to damages shall
stand affirmed unless the trial court in its discretion and in
aCcordance with the views expressed in this opinion orders
an additur within 30 days after its receipt of our remittitur.
If an additur is ordered,· it shall be accepted or rejected by
defendant within the time prescribed by the trial court, but
1 "The most plausible explanation tor DWnick is that it rested on the
reexamination elause ot the Seventh Amendment, as opposed to the clause
guaranteeing that the right to jury trial "shall be preserved." (See
Btmder, 8'Upra, fn. 8, at p. 627, fn. 53.) Moreover, it is doubtful that
DWnicl; would be followed today.. (See, e.g., Genzel v. Halvorson, supra,
248 Minn. 527, 531; Fisch v. Manger, 8'Upra, 24 N.J. 66, 74.) There is
also authority that the present case is distinguishable from Dimick on its
tacts. (See United States v. Kennesaw Mountain Battlefield .AS81/.. (5th
Cir. 1938) 99 F.2d 830, 834, cert. den.), 306 U.S. 646 [83 L.Ed. 1045, 59
S.Ot. 587] and tn. 14, supra.)

the court shall not prescribe a period of time longer than 30
days from the date of its order. Plaintiff shall recover his
costs on appeal.
McComb, J., Peters, J.1 Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.

